When a former U.S. president acknowledges that he won't use e-mail to correspond with foreign leaders to avoid snooping by the NSA, you know the image of America as a bastion of freedom - at least online - has dropped a few more notches.
Security experts are sizing up the challenges that would be involved in implementing a federal government proposal to continuously monitor employees and contractors with security clearances in hopes of preventing leaks of sensitive information.
At his March 11 Senate confirmation hearing, Navy Vice Adm. Michael Rogers, chosen by President Obama to be the next director of the National Security Agency, declines to characterize NSA leaker Edward Snowden as a traitor.
Buried deep within a 308-page report from a presidential panel on ways to tighten federal surveillance and IT security programs are important recommendations on how to mitigate the insider threat at federal agencies.
An independent presidential panel makes recommendations to limit the National Security Agency's surveillance methods, including curtailing the way the government systematically collects and stores metadata from Americans' phone calls.
A federal district court judge's ruling that a National Security Agency program collecting metadata from telephone calls could be unconstitutional suggests that the law hasn't kept pace with changing technology.
NSA Director Gen. Keith Alexander says the agency has taken 41 actions to prevent leaks by insiders in the wake of disclosures of classified documents about the agency's surveillance programs by former agency contractor Edward Snowden.
You can be outraged that the NSA collects Internet communications records of U.S. citizens. But don't be surprised, says sociologist William Staples. This is just one example of our "culture of surveillance."
For years, researchers have studied malicious insider threats. But how can organizations protect themselves from insiders who make a mistake or are taken advantage of in a way that puts the organization at risk?